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Will the Iran ceasefire hold for long or lead to conclusive peace?

While the Americans are expected to adhere to the two-week truce, the other two parties are less likely to do so (File/AFP)
While the Americans are expected to adhere to the two-week truce, the other two parties are less likely to do so (File/AFP)
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09 Apr 2026 01:04:05 GMT9
09 Apr 2026 01:04:05 GMT9

A catastrophe was averted on Tuesday night, when the US, Pakistan and Iran announced an agreement to stop the war for two weeks and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

It came just a few short hours before the deadline President Donald Trump had set for Iran to accept his peace proposals, or else “face hell,” asserting that the US had a plan under which every bridge and power plant in Iran could be destroyed. Adding pressure onto the Iranians and mediators, he said in an online post on Tuesday morning: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” if a deal was not reached.

Following the truce announcement, the US and Iran each issued separate statements claiming victory.

Trump said that subject to Iran’s agreeing to the “complete, immediate and safe opening of the Strait of Hormuz,” he agreed to suspend the bombing for two weeks. One reason he accepted Pakistan’s mediation was that the US had “already met and exceeded all Military objectives,” while another was that the parties were “very far along with a definitive Agreement concerning long-term peace with Iran, and PEACE in the Middle East.”

Despite the extensive loss of life and devastation of its military capabilities over the past 40 days, Iran’s statement was defiant. Speaking for the Supreme National Security Council, Foreign Minister Sayed Abbas Aragchi, said: “If attacks against Iran are halted, our powerful armed forces will cease their defensive operations. For a period of two weeks, safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s armed forces and with consideration of technical limitations.”

While the Americans are expected to adhere to the terms of the two-week truce, the other two parties are less likely to do so

Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

The US and Iran credited Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, with persuading them to reach the deal. China was also mentioned as working behind the scenes.

Sharif announced the “immediate ceasefire everywhere including Lebanon and elsewhere, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.” He added that negotiations for a “conclusive agreement to settle all disputes” were scheduled for Friday, April 10. 

Prior to the announcement, the US had sent Iran a 15-point proposal through Pakistan, dealing with Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its regional proxies. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz was later added after Iran effectively closed it. Last week, Trump announced there had been “very good and productive” conversations with Iran. US officials said the progress made in the talks was due to their success in achieving important military goals of the war “ahead of schedule,” according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

After initially denying receiving the American proposal, Tehran later acknowledged it after Pakistan confirmed it had passed it along to Iran. On April 6 Tehran came up with its own 10-point proposal, which apparently included a set of maximalist demands so unrealistic that they appeared to be directed more at domestic audiences.

While the agreement is welcome, many question whether a “conclusive” accord can be reached during the two-week pause. The three Iranian interlocutors mentioned by Sharif may not be the ones calling the shots. Parliament speaker Ghalibaf is known to be close to the supreme leader and the IRGC, but he does not make the decisions. The IRGC has made it clear that President Pezeshkian and Aragchi do not either. Iran’s binary system of formal government versus the militias has frustrated negotiators before, but now the confusion is greater, as it may take time for the new supreme leader to assert control and keep the competing factions in check.

The other wild card is Israel, which is reportedly unhappy with the truce agreement and could break it at any moment. Immediately after the truce was announced, Israel disagreed on interpreting its terms.

“Israel supports President Trump’s decision to suspend strikes against Iran for two weeks, subject to Iran immediately opening the straits and stopping all attacks on the US, Israel and countries in the region,” it said. However, it added: “The two-weeks ceasefire does not include Lebanon” — but Iran and Pakistan thought it did.

And despite Pakistani prime minister’s assertion that the ceasefire was effective “immediately,” Iran continued to launch attacks against GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

So, while the Americans are expected to adhere to the terms of the two-week truce, the other two parties are less likely to do so.

There is also a wide perception gap between the US and Iran. In the words of Iranian-American academic Karim Sajidpour: “One of the US government’s recurring mistakes about Iran has been to conflate the country’s national interests with regime interests. The two are opposites in many ways. What benefits the Iranian people — global economic reintegration, diplomatic recognition, investment, normalcy — threatens a regime that operates an extensive mafia and thrives in isolation. The carrots that America offers the nation are sticks to the men who rule it. And the sticks that America wields against the regime — isolation, conflict, and chaos — are carrots to men whose power depends on all three.” If this diagnosis is accurate, it may be impossible to motivate Iran to accept any compromise.

On the other hand, if you assume that the Iranian government will make rational decisions based on the interest of the country, there are reasons to believe that a deal is possible. For one, Iran has lost much of its conventional weapons, including its navy and air defense and was counting on two other defense mechanisms, which have also failed. Its “forward defense” strategy fell through when its regional proxies were severely weakened and when Syria regained its independence. Iran had hoped that its proxies would hold its enemies at bay far from its territory. Instead, this war was fought over Iran’s own territory.

The other pillar was reliance on missiles and drones to make up for its disadvantage when it came to conventional weapons, where its adversaries had a clear advantage. In this war, those missiles and drones were intercepted more than 90 percent of the time.

Because of these failures, Iran used the Strait of Hormuz for leverage, but that also could be neutralized by devising an international or regional scheme to run the waterway for the benefit of both littoral and user states, according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

Trump’s apocalyptic threat if a deal is not made should also figure in Iran’s calculations to favor a deal within this narrow window of opportunity.

  • Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation. The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the GCC. X: @abuhamad1
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