In his book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace,” John Maynard Keynes warned that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War could lead to another war for the next generation. Similarly, the latest war in Lebanon is, to a large extent, a consequence of the imperfect resolution of the last one and ending it should not pave the way to the next.

Life in wartime Lebanon consists of being glued to TV news and social media, with endless phone conversations trying to figure out when and how it will end and what will happen later. I am full of admiration for news anchors and the way they grill politicians.

At the center of today’s debate is UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was agreed more than 18 years ago, in August 2006, as a short-term measure to stop the hostilities in Israel’s last war with Hezbollah.

The main issue was pointed out to me by a former European diplomat with 20-plus years of experience in the region. He warned against the manner in which 1701 was being renegotiated and the problems of its implementation. In 2006, it was the Lebanese government that conducted the negotiations and it has to be brought back into the process. This needs to avoid being turned into a West Bank and Gaza situation.

What did not happen and should be emphasized is already included in Paragraph 8 of UNSC Resolution 1701, which called for a permanent, long-term solution based on the Taif Agreement. The 2006 war ended with a cessation of hostilities under certain conditions, which included the withdrawal of Hezbollah’s combatants and its arms from a zone up to the Litani river, with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in charge of its application. The fact that we are here again today is an indication of its failure. Going back to it may be a case of making the same mistake twice, but with the grave addition that this time the state is absent from the equation. By making Hezbollah the interlocutor, the repercussions could be far worse than last time.

Going back to 1701 may be a case of making the same mistake twice, but with the grave addition that this time the state is absent

Nadim Shehadi

The Taif Agreement that ended the civil war in 1990 called for the dissolution of all militias and armed groups. Hezbollah was excluded at the time on the basis that it was a resistance force and not a militia. A formula should be reached internally to allow it to comply with the agreement.

There is a chain of agreements and resolutions. Applying Taif would also fulfill the requirements of a sequence of UN resolutions on Lebanon: UNSC Resolution 1559 of 2004 basically called for the application of Taif; Resolution 1680 of May 17, 2006, called for the application of 1559; and 1701 of August that same year called for the application of both 1559 and 1680. They all point to the armistice agreement of 1949, which delineated the Israeli-Lebanese borders and which was broken by Lebanon in 1969 when it gave the Palestine Liberation Organization the right to attack Israel from southern Lebanon. At the time, this was done to maintain the peace internally, but instead it sowed the seeds of external conflict.

In fact, the chain goes back further, as the main points of the May 17, 1983, agreement between Israel and the Lebanese government, following the Israeli invasion of 1982, were incorporated into the Taif Agreement. Again, this points to the armistice agreement of 1949, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the armed groups that at that time were Palestinian. The recently published memoirs of Dr. Elie Salem, Lebanon’s foreign minister at the time, recounted that story. After the agreement was accepted by the majority of Lebanon’s MPs and politicians, Israel introduced additional interpretations and conditions that sabotaged the agreement and allowed Syria to veto its application.

The principal task now is to navigate both internal and external conflicts at the same time to stabilize the border with Israel and prevent the situation resulting in a civil war. There is a risk of internal conflict after Israel’s withdrawal due to indications that Hezbollah is trying to blame its failure on the rest of the Lebanese, whom it accuses of collaborating with Israel or of supporting its attack. The aftermath of the cessation of hostilities should be managed to prevent an internal conflict.

The principal task now is to navigate both internal and external conflicts to stabilize the border and prevent a civil war

Nadim Shehadi

The danger lies in the “security arrangements” also mentioned in Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1701, in which UNIFIL was charged with ensuring that no buildup of arms was allowed between the Litani river and the Israel-Lebanon border. But UNIFIL was given only observer powers and it is unlikely to be given the powers of enforcement, like the UN and NATO presence in Kosovo, as this would require another UN Security Council resolution. Also, without a “permanent” solution, UNIFIL is no longer interim and is not sustainable.

Going back to the analogy with Palestine, the Palestinian Authority and Israel cooperate and coordinate according to the Oslo Accords and, since 2007, they have agreed to focus on security coordination above all due to the alleged widespread threat from Hamas. This is where the PA was accused of having an agreement so that Israel could protect it from Hamas in the West Bank. The PA was discredited because when it acts it looks like it is doing Israel’s job, while when it does not act then Israel intervenes and the PA looks like it is collaborating against its own people. Could this happen to Lebanon too?

The implementation of Resolution 1701 could pit the Lebanese army against Hezbollah, which it is not equipped for. Unlike other armies in the region, the Lebanese army cannot fight internal battles to suppress one party or another. At best, its doctrine is that of separating the parties and acting as a mediator. It will be accused of doing that for Israel, acting as a buffer to protect it. If it does intervene to stop Hezbollah rearming, it will be accused of acting on behalf of Israel, almost like the PA. Hamas controlled Gaza in the same way as Hezbollah controlled southern Lebanon.

We still do not know the full terms of this week’s agreement, but if it is setting up the Lebanese army to fail, with a temporary ceasefire as a test, then the next war could involve more than just Hezbollah. Ultimately, the solution should be an internal one in Lebanon, rebuilding the state that was paralyzed and incapacitated as a consequence of ignoring the long-term clause of 1701 since the last war.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus