Since the beginning of the protests in Iran five weeks ago, it has been clear that Tehran is targeting European countries with accusations that the unrest is being manipulated by an external actor. In the absence of any US diplomatic presence in Iran since the hostage crisis of 1979-81, contacts with European officials and threats to European citizens inside the country have become a political tool for the Iranian regime and a way for it to defy the West.

Iranian hostage diplomacy started with the US just after the rise of the new revolutionary regime in 1979. Shortly after this first experience, European countries became useful pawns to manage Iran’s confrontational new relations with the US. This strategy also aimed to create a sense of solidarity among Iran’s ruling elites. Another objective was to hurt the West without taking any risk of military escalation with the US.

This low-cost Iranian strategy has exposed the paradox facing European countries. On the one hand, they are focusing on the never-ending nuclear negotiations to prepare for the US returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal. On the other hand, they are facing a crisis in their bilateral diplomatic relationships with Tehran. This has been true since at least the failed Iranian terrorist attack in Villepinte, Paris, in 2018 against a group of Iranian dissidents based in France. The European choice of keeping a low profile and continuing official contacts with the regime are key factors in explaining the Iranian escalation against European interests.

The Iranian regime is pursuing two main objectives through practicing hostage diplomacy. First is the promotion of the narrative that an external hand is behind the domestic uprising against the revolution and its pillars. Therefore, the regime needs to prove its case via European hostages. They are accused of fomenting domestic protests and of being part of a broader project of security and cultural “infiltrations.” These baseless claims allow the Iranian regime to seek an exchange of prisoners in order to free Iranian terrorists jailed in European countries, especially the one jailed in Belgium following the failed terrorist attack of 2018.

Secondly, this strategy is forcing European capitals to keep the diplomatic lines of dialogue open with Iran to seek the release of their citizens. Indeed, the question of Iranian hostage diplomacy has become an internal issue in European countries and they have to address public concerns about European citizens being detained and jailed.

This Iranian strategy of manipulation is also a diplomatic tool to avoid European sanctions in light of the current protests. Tehran warned Brussels that if European countries imposed new sanctions against Iranian representatives accused of suppressing the protests, this would end the bilateral relationships between Iran and Europe. One also has to consider that, in the construction of this Iranian strategy, France has today — just like during the Green Movement in 2009 — become a special target.

The idea that it is possible to support both the JCPOA and political change inside Iran at the same time is flawed

Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami

The choice of France as the main European target can be best explained by three factors. Firstly, Paris is, along with Germany, a leading power in the EU and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as well as a highly visible diplomatic actor in regard to the Iranian nuclear file. Therefore, targeting France means challenging the French position on the Iranian file, as well as sending a message to a close ally of Paris: America. Secondly, there is an ideological dimension from Tehran’s perspective. It wants to target French secularism in order to appear as the vanguard in the fight against a “decadent” West. Thirdly, Iran seeks to put pressure on French diplomats in Tehran and to limit all European diplomatic activity on Iranian soil during the current domestic protests.

The view from France is that a comprehension of Iranian affairs is not a top priority, except for helping to build a regional policy to promote a “peace agenda” in the Gulf and for Paris to appear as a diplomatic mediator. More broadly, currently, when most French media outlets talk about Iran, they focus on the arrest of a fifth French hostage shortly after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s recent speech about the West’s supposed role in the national uprising.

They also talk about the veil. The French narrative is not based on a study of the internal situation in Iran, but is rather a projection of French colonial history and concerns about the current Iranian events. In other words, this means that the topic is no longer the forced veiling of women by the Iranian theocratic state, but rather a debate about the situation of the Muslim minority in France. French media outlets have no access to Iranian territory; therefore, they rely on far-away perceptions to understand the scale of the protests and the peculiar situation of state-society relations in Iran since the 1979 revolution.

Last but not least, to overcome the “nuclear only” focus on Iran, European countries are told that they should build a comprehensive policy that integrates competing policy objectives: Avoiding nuclear proliferation but also supporting political change inside Iran and, above all, not giving legitimacy to the Iranian regime, which is seeking high-level contacts with Western leaders to manipulate public opinion inside the country.

However, the idea that it is possible to support both the JCPOA and political change inside Iran at the same time is flawed. Indeed, a new nuclear deal would provide the Iranian regime with a much-needed financial boost, allowing it to build stronger economic partnerships with Europe’s adversaries, namely China and Russia.

Ultimately, reassuring the Iranian regime regarding European intentions is not an option. Tehran needs external conflicts for crisis management purposes at home. Therefore, European countries should find a way not to submit to Iranian blackmail, while pursuing a policy of empowering the social transformation process in Iran without helping the regime to survive.

• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is president of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). Twitter: @mohalsulami